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Spatial metaphors are pervasive across models and theories about the structure and the meaning-
making processes of the human mind: metaphorical and metonymic mappings (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980, Barcelona 2012), mental spaces (Fauconnier 1994, 1997) or semantic domains 
(Fauconnier and Sweetser 1996, Brandt 2004) are examples of this spatial ubiquity in cognitive 
science.  
In narratology, categories of location and place are often correlated with narrative spaces as 
expression of a dynamics of unfolding of events, from initial situation to catastrophe to its 
consequence and result (Brandt 2009). Narrative as such is viewed as a compelling way of 
worldmaking (Nünning 2010, Goodman 1975), inviting further metaphors in the description of 
the reading experience, such as ‘being transported’ by means of ‘mentally performing’ narrated 
actions and experiences (Gerrig 2003). 
This paper follows a cognitive approach to literary texts (Zunshine 2015, Baumbach et. al. 
2017) as a framework for the analysis of space, viewed as a central element in narrative and as 
conceptual unit for sense-making. The experience of progressing through narrative is understood 
as the navigation through space, and complementarily the experience of space, perceived or 
imagined, can unfold in a mental topography of representation. The description of this exchange 
is complemented by the analysis of a short literary narrative. 
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Let me begin with an invitation. Imagine walking along a beach and suddenly finding a bottle 
with a message inside. You pick up the bottle, take the message out and read: “Meet me here 
tomorrow”. While perfectly intelligible, provided it is written in a language you master, the 
message is undecipherable in its illocutionary inference; in other words, you are uncertain as to 
what to do with it. The problem introduced by the situation is threefold: you do not know the 
referent to “here” (at the beach, where you found the bottle? Half a mile further? Where it was 
launched at sea?), you do not know what is meant by “tomorrow” (the day after you found the 
message, the day after it came ashore?), and more importantly you fail to ascertain the 
enunciational frame of the message: the first and second person and the subjects that the 
pronouns indicate. This simple example illustrates the significance of deixis, which in linguistics 
denotes the semantic relation of indexicality or the intrinsic pointing of certain words and 
phrases to temporal, spatial and subjective coordinates. Without this anchoring, the semantics of 
the words is understandable, but the discourse semantics fails. The example further shows that 
both space and time are ascertained on the basis of a reference to a subject, and so is the 
intersubject, the alter, a meaningful entity only with respect to that center of subjectivity, from 
where the coordinates irradiate. 
This little message is the more intriguing as you engaged in the little exercise with great 
ease. When prompted to imagine a beach, to picture yourself walking on that beach, up to the 
point you came across the bottle and picked it up for its content, I trust you did not hesitate to 
conjure up a scenery which, regardless of individual variations, certainly entailed sand and 
sun(set), gentle waves, a bit of breeze. You may have pictured the scene from the angular 
perspective with which you navigate the world, or you may have seen yourself walking as 
though the scene were filmed by someone else’s camera. In either case, you did not protest at my 
request, so I am confident the conceptual shift was taken at ease. My linguistic trigger invited 
you to conceive of a situation in which the location seems more prominent than time: the beach, 
with its coming and going of waves and one’s own undefined path, stresses the uncertainty of 
this accidental finding, while a more defined time seems less significant (at sunset? In the 
morning?). 




This brief exercise already points to the issues this paper intends to address and which could 
be summarized as follows: 
1. The indexicality principle of language, from enunciation to subjectivity, and the 
anchoring of reference for understanding; 
2. The shift from space to mental space, and the metaphorical conceptualization of 
imagination as location for alternative experience; 
3. The experience of reading (narrative fiction, in particular) as being transported to an 
alternative world; space as a structuring element of this mental experience; 
4. A brief illustration of the experience of reading as (mental) spatial shift. 
1. Indexicality 
The genealogy of the term indexicality leads us to semiotics, the study of signs and meaning, of 
conceptualization and interaction, of representation and interpretation. Index is one of the three 
main types of signs defined by semiotician Charles Sanders Peirce (291), which has with the 
representamen a relation of contiguity or proximity. The term index means ‘indicate’ and ‘to 
indicate’ finds it most prominent expression in the gesture of pointing. This gestural sign, simple 
at the surface, is rather intricate in the balance of attention, reference and intention that it entails. 
The gesture of pointing creates an invisible direct line from the tip of the finger to the object of 
reference in the vicinity and directs the other’s attention not toward itself but to the direction it 
indicates. The gaze so oriented searches for the end goal of this invisible line, while the mind 
fills it with meaning by relating it to the anticipated intention behind or before the gesture. 
Evolutionary psychologist Michael Tomasello regards pointing as the likely precursor to human 
language in that it entails a condition without which symbolic communication is not possible: the 
conveyance of an intention and the acknowledgement by the other of both this intention and the 
act of sharing it. This capacity for sociality seems to be a human exclusive and without it human 
communication would be at best meaningless.3  
In pragmatics, indexicality is defined as:  
 
																																								 																				
3 “[A]pes can, in unnatural circumstances with members of the human species, learn to do something in some ways 
equivalent to pointing […]. And yet there is not a single reliable observation, by any scientist anywhere, of one ape 
pointing for another” (Tomasello 507). 




the pervasive context-dependency of natural language utterances, including such varied 
phenomena as regional accent (indexing speaker’s identity), indicators of verbal etiquette 
(marking deference and demeanor), the referential use of pronouns (I, you, we, he, etc.)/ 
demonstratives (this, that), deictic adverbs (here, there, now, then), and tense. In all of these 
cases, the interpretation of the indexical form depends strictly on the context in which it is 
uttered. (Hanks 124) 
 
In other words, an indexical sign in language is one deployed by the speaker to refer to an aspect 
of their proximal situativity. This is what is meant by the contiguity of reference in indices 
(unlike the similarity of iconic signs or the conventionality of symbols). While immediate 
situativity is relatively easy to verify in contexts of immediate verbal interaction (utterances are 
decoded with reference to the utterer), the definition above entails two aspects of complexity. On 
the one hand, context is larger than situation. Regional accent as indicator of identity goes 
beyond geographical reference and may encompass ideas related to that particular region and its 
inhabitants (stereotypes in humor often explore these). Moreover, verbal etiquette as indication 
of an attitude of deference is an index of social hierarchy. And much more may be entailed in 
such indexical words: tacit knowledge luring from experience, individual or shared, or 
representations that densely furnish the human environment which, in the words of art historian 
Dieter Wuttke, is cultural by nature (Wuttke 79). 
On the other hand, in cases where utterer and interlocutor do not share the coordinates of 
their immediate situation (as in distance calls, in historical texts or in fiction), the indexical link 
between the sign and its referent is no longer immediately available and it may need the creation 
of a world in which both utterer and context of utterance are plausible and meaningful.  
Two ideas we should retain thus far. The first is the ease with which we follow linguistic 
prompts and generate in imagination spaces and situations we may or may not have experienced. 
The second idea is that language is not understood in absolute terms but always stands in close 
relation with the context of the utterance: the here-and-now and the persons in the enunciation.  
2. From Space to Mental Space 
Ever since the cognitive turn in the humanities in the 80s, concepts such as metaphorical and 
metonymic mappings (Lakoff and Johnson, Barcelona), mental spaces (Fauconnier 1994) or 
semantic domains (Fauconnier and Sweetser 1996, Brandt 2004) have proliferated in the field of 




cognitive linguistics (particularly semantics) and from there they have been used in cognitive 
poetics or cognitive semiotics. These spatial concepts are metaphorical in their use and iconically 
stand for spaces of thought that are not otherwise easily referred to or even conceptualized. The 
relation these concepts as signs have to the realities they represent is that of conceptual 
similarity.  
In their seminal book Metaphors we live by (2003 [1980]) linguist George Lakoff and 
philosopher Mark Johnson propose a view of metaphor as a strategy of thought, a way of 
thinking about realities, which we cannot directly perceive, in terms of others that we can access 
experientially. The authors claim that metaphor is above all a strategy of thought, more than a 
rhetorical device deployed for aesthetic effect. It is a way of thinking about reality, and its 
linguistic manifestation is pervasive across instances of discourse and everyday language. The 
process of metaphorical thinking involves two conceptual domains: a source domain and a target 
domain, and a mapping from source to target. This implies that the understanding occurs not 
only at the level of a singular concept but involves the entire domain. Using their example 
(Lakoff and Johnson 82-86), when faced with an expression like “to attack another person’s 
claim”, we activate the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR and with it a whole 
understanding of arguments (the two contenders, the antagonistic views and aims, the 
argumentation and rhetorical fluency) as two enemies with opposing goals and sharp weapons, as 
well as strategies of fight. The same goes for other everyday expressions, which point to 
fundamental ways of understanding one reality in terms of another: ‘saving time’ assumes an 
understanding of TIME AS MONEY, ‘a dear friend has departed’ points to an understanding of 
LIFE (and death, for that matter) AS A JOURNEY, or ‘our relationship is going south’ which 
entails a more intricate conceptual architecture of an evaluative attitude based on a crossing of 
the semiotic representation of space in a map (north is up, south is down) and the orientational 
axis “up – abundance – positive” vs. “down – scarcity – negative”. The crucial point in Lakoff 
and Johnson’s proposal is that understanding and communicating about certain ideas (trivial, not 
necessarily aesthetic, but certainly not immediately tangible), happens by calling up another 
referent, resulting from embodied experience, which lends to the target concept an imagetic 
gateway for understanding. The result is a set of metaphors we live, think and communicate by.  
The metaphorical mappings, the authors claim, happen between conceptual domains. This is 
in itself a spatial metaphor, which the authors try to explain: 
 




What constitutes a basic domain of experience? Each such domain is a structured whole 
within our experience that is conceptualized as what we have called an experiential gestalt. 
Such gestalts are experientially basic because they characterize structured wholes within 
recurrent human experience. […] Domains of experience that are organized as gestalts in 
terms of such natural dimensions seem to us to be natural kinds of experience. (Lakoff and 
Johnson 117) 
 
Lakoff and Johnson continue stating that these domains result from the experience of our bodies, 
our interactions with the physical environment and our interactions with others within a frame of 
culture. While the use of the spatial metaphor of “domains” to refer to conceptual content seems 
unproblematic (it seems to result from a long-established understanding of knowledge in 
territorial terms – think of scientific areas, fields of knowledge or theoretical territories), the 
authors do not venture into establishing a finite set of such domains, a project that would make 
sense for a cognitive approach, which departs from the assumption of a common cognitive 
structure, before or beyond cultural editing. Subsequent theoretical attempts, particularly in 
cognitive linguistics, for the most part do not address this issue. In his Glossary of Cognitive 
linguistics, Vyvyan Evans defines conceptual or experiential domains as “relatively complex 
knowledge structures which relate to coherent aspects of experience” (61-62). 
And referring to the projections from one conceptual domain to the other, so-called 
mappings, he defines them as “correspondences between entities inhering in regions of the 
conceptual system” which, when stable, are activated for “purposes of situated understanding” 
(130). Notice the spatial terms in his address, but an uncompromised attitude toward ascertaining 
which and how many such domains there may be. 
Ronald Langacker, one of the founding authors of cognitive linguistics, uses the concepts of 
domain in his Cognitive Grammar.  
 
All linguistic units are context-dependent to some degree. A context for the characterization 
of a semantic unit is referred to as a domain. Domains are necessarily cognitive entities: 
mental experiences, representational spaces, concepts, or conceptual complexes. (Langacker 
Foundations of Cognitive Grammar 147) 
  
And further: 





What exactly is a domain? To serve its purpose, the term is broadly interpreted as indicating 
any kind of conception or realm of experience […] how many domains we recognize and 
which ones, depends on our purpose and to some extent is arbitrary. The important thing is 
to recognize the diverse and multifaceted nature of the conceptual content an expression 
evokes. (Langacker Cognitive Grammar. A Basic Introduction 44) 
 
According to Langacker, thus, domains are necessarily cognitive entities –  mental experiences, 
representational spaces, or conceptual complexes – which provide a context for the 
characterization of a semantic unit. 
Semiotician Per Aage Brandt builds up on this idea that semantic units are meaningful 
within a context and goes on to claim that “contexts are structured with distinct semantic 
domains, which are grounded in bodily experience, not only in a basic sense, as referring to 
motor activities, but in the sense of a stable articulation of our life-world as an experienceable 
whole” (Brandt The Architecture of Semantic Domains 33). In his “Architecture of Semantic 
Domains”, an anthropology and philosophy inspired proposal, Brandt claims that domains have 
structure, so as to be referential units for meaning. They are “constituted by human experience in 
the richest possible phenomenological sense” (Brandt 37) and are thus not language-dependent 
or culturally determined, but rather linguistically edited and culturally informed. Grounded on 
linguistic analysis and drawing from anthropology and phenomenology, Brandt proposes an 
architecture founded on four basic domains of experience – the physical, the social, the mental 
and the interactional – whose subsequent progressively complex integrations result in a structure 
of 16 related domains, against which metaphorical conceptualizations are construed and 
interpreted.  
One further prevalent “spatial metaphor” in cognitive science is the concept of mental space. 
First proposed by linguist Gilles Fauconnier, the concept refers to “partial structures that 
proliferate when we think and talk, allowing a fine-grained partitioning of our discourse and 
knowledge structures” (Mappings in Thought and Language 11). 
Fauconnier’s approach is an alternative to logical semantics and an attempt at solving 
problems in philosophy of language, in particular linguistic reference. By positing that discourse 
prompts the set up of mental spaces and of connections between them, ensured by linguistic 




space builders, Fauconnier aims at accounting for the flow of thought that accompanies the flow 
of discourse.  
The concept of mental space turned out to be crucial for the subsequent theory Fauconnier 
developed with Mark Turner: Conceptual Integration or Blending Theory. In their seminal book 
The Way We Think, this is how they present the concept: 
 
[M]ental spaces are small conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk, for purposes 
of local understanding and action. […] Spaces are built from many sources. One of this is 
the set of conceptual domains we already know about. […] A single mental space can be 
built up out of knowledge from many separate domains. (102) 
 
Words are thus prompts for building the representation of content, which inhabits a dedicated 
conceptual construct, dynamic and interactive by nature. Conceptual content integrates with 
other content in what the authors name a space of integration, conceptually valid but perceptually 
impossible: the space of the blend.  
One interesting case in which space is used for understanding an indirect experience is the 
conceptualization of the experience of an other in terms of space: if I were in your shoes, à ta 
place, no teu lugar, an deiner Stelle indicates that assuming the experience of another is 
assuming his spatial existence, his perspective, possible only by assuming their location in 
(conceptual) space: this spatial taking over is accomplished mentally, by simulation, and is often 
accompanied in discourse by a different tense, marking the space of possibility, distinct from that 
of actuality. This mental space transition is, among other things, a necessary condition for 
empathy, as shall be seen ahead. 
Drawing a balance on what was outlaid in this section, we could perhaps stress three 
important points. The first is that the study of human cognition is the study of mental 
representation of reality, either given or imagined. This understanding is based on the view that 
humans create and share representations of reality and experience, and that they can materialize 
such representations in artefacts that can be shared across space and time because they are 
grounded on stable textual meanings. 
The second idea is that this stability of meaning can be accounted for by the fact that 
meaning is generated in context and context is structured by stable domains of experience that, 
taken together, compose the human phenomenological life-world. 




And the third idea relates to metacognition, i.e. cognition about cognition. Metacognition 
relies strongly on spatial metaphors, which both inform the discourse about the way we think, 
and are structural and foundational for models and theories of the mind and thought. The concept 
of space, translated into “domains”, “architecture” or “mental spaces” is thus more than the 
source of metaphor (conceptual and otherwise); it is constitutive of an understanding of human 
cognition. 
In narrative, space is a structuring element of conceptual experience. To this we devote the 
next section. 
3. Spatial foundations of the reading experience  
The study of space in narrative can be informed by two perspectives. On the one hand, the 
traditional perspective of narratology, which views space on a par with other constitutive 
elements of narrative such as time, character, narrator, perspective or consciousness. On the 
other hand, a more recent cognitive perspective on narrative seeks to understand what goes on 
when we engage with narratives, by exploring concepts like ‘immersion’ or ‘empathy’. We 
should consider these perspectives, each at a turn.  
In narratology, the category of space involves related ones like location, surroundings, the 
natural or the urban setting of actions, as well as the objects and other features that furnish these 
spaces. As with other elements of narrative, every indication of space is intentional: it provides 
not only the background to the unfolding action, but often the way in which a given spatial 
environment is conveyed in the narrative – through techniques of focalization – can entail 
important hints as to the mental states of a given character in a specific moment.  
Studies focusing on space in narrative are relatively sparse, when compared to the attention 
devoted to time. Gerhard Hoffman in his book Raum, Situation, erzählte Wirklichkeit (“Space, 
situation, narrated reality”, 1978) proposes three types of basic spaces: a mood-invested space 
(gestimmter Raum), in which both space and objects acquire an expressive function, generating 
certain moods or invested with symbolic meaning – location is a center of experience, in this 
case; a space of the action (Aktionsraum), which is perhaps the elementary function of space as 




contextualizing element for characters and events, and the space of observation 
(Anschauungsraum), entailing a panoramic overview.4 
In his Theory of Space in Narrative (1984), Gabriel Zoran develops a three-level model for 
studying the space-time relation in narrative, entailing 1) a topological level, which corresponds 
to the cartography of the narrative world, based on all the elements of the text; 2) the chronotopic 
level, which builds on Bakthin’s concept of chronotope or the nexus of space and time, and 
which contemplates these two dimensions and their relationship in the trajectory of the narrative 
unfolding; and 3) the textual level, where space is structured by the semiotic medium of the 
narrative text, as when the linear nature of verbal language organizes spatial relationships into a 
temporal continuum. These two exemplary typologies of space – Hoffmann’s and Zoran’s – are 
proposals for dealing with the category of space in a differentiated way, not just on its own, but 
in relation with other narrative categories (much as the differentiation of narrating and narrated 
time is intertwined with the category of the narrator). Taken together, they provide a first 
descriptive map for this category. 
More recently, Per Aage Brandt (2009) has developed an outline for what he terms a 
“semio-cognitive narratology”. This proposal draws from an understanding of the literary text 
and its meaning based on a cognitive prototype of categorization, by which we relate the text to a 
prototype of human exchange. The process by which we understand the meaning of the text 
would thus be related to the experience of listening to and making sense of a sentence. This way 
of understanding the meaning of a text is analogous to the process of sense-making of perceptual 
input, which consists in matching this input to known categories of experience. Without denying 
that the interpretation of a text relies on a cultural inform, Brandt tries to propose an alternative 
to a discretionary reading of the literary text based on idiosyncratic associations or ideological 
frameworks. The point of departure is how the human mind works. 
According to Brandt’s cognitive narratology, the text can be viewed as the exchange 
between agents, spaces and forces which interact dynamically for the progression of narrative 
events. Although not explicitly mentioned, this view is influenced by Leonard Talmy’s “force 
dynamics” (2003), a theory of causation that manifests itself in language and structures 
																																								 																				
4 Hoffmann 1978, Ch. 2, pp. 55-108). Interesting are also further distinctions of structures of space related with 
different genres, and also the general space structure of the novel (the book studies the American novel), and in 
particular the role of the city as structuring element. 




experience in the physical, social, discourse, and mental domains. Central to Brandt’s proposal is 
the notion of space, which he describes as follows: 
 
In each story, a narrative world is instantiated in terms of a sequence of event spaces, i.e. 
more or less clearly defined places set up by locative indications or descriptions, where 
characters are actively or passively connected to the play of conflicting forces of different 
types and affected by these forces through narrated time. (Forces and Spaces 9) 
 
Spaces are thus event spaces, narrative instances often distributed through different locations, but 
not reduced to these described venues, and causally related by the interplay of agents and forces 
as they evolve throughout the story. The canonical spaces are the initial conditioning space, a 
catastrophic space where a critical event occurs leading to the consequence space, where a 
change of state effects, and finally a conclusion space of resolution. Brandt relates the dynamic 
interaction of agents, forces and spaces with variations of genre, through the deformation of a 
base genre of realistic narrative. We leave aside this further development to retain from his 
proposal the crucial understanding of space as conceptual scope for the representation of 
significant narrative stages or events. Space is thus more than location. 
Besides this narratological understanding of space, which we have illustrated with the 
proposals by Hoffmann, Zoran and Brandt, space is also an important element in cognitive 
approaches to narrative and to reading, as they have been developed by cognitive narratologists 
and psychologists of reading. An example of one such approach is that by psychologist Richard 
Gerrig, who in his book Experiencing Narrative Worlds offers an account of the experience of 
reading in terms of two structuring metaphors: the experience of reading or engaging in a 
narrative as that of being transported away from the reader’s situativity or his immediate here 
and now; and this experience as the result of the reader performing certain actions. Gerrig’s 
approach provides an alternative to reader’s passive attitude of being transported, by claiming 
that the reader actively contributes to the experience. This view is shared by other theorists 
approaching narrative from a cognitive angle. Neuroscientist Vittorio Gallese (2005), for 
example, proposes the notion of embodied simulation as a mental performance that accounts for 
the experience of reading, and specifically of the experience of immersion that he sees as a 
condition for empathy. In a joint paper with Hanna Wojciehowski, Gallese draws on philosopher 
Alfonso Iacono and his idea that engagement with a work of art affords the experience of 




inhabiting an intermediate world, whose fictional character becomes natural by that performative 
entrance, and is no longer an artificial character. Wojciehowski and Gallese expand on this view 
of the naturalization of narrative (fictional) worlds: 
 
We propose that embodied simulation can be relevant to our experience of narrative for two 
reasons: First, because of the Feeling of Body triggered by narrated characters and situations 
with whom we identify by means of the mirroring mechanisms they evoke. In such a way, 
embodied simulation generates the peculiar seeing-as that plays a peculiar role in our 
aesthetic experience. Second, because of the bodily memories and imaginative associations 
the narrated material can awake in our readers’ minds, without the need to reflect upon them 
explicitly. (n.p.) 
 
The common view of Gerrig and Wojciehowski and Gallese is that the engagement with 
narrative is not passive. In this passage the authors propose “Feeling of Body” as a parallel 
concept to “Theory of Mind”, which has been studied at length in narrative, among others, by 
Lisa Zunshine (2006), Patrick Colm Hogan (2014) or Kidd & Castano (2013). Reading implies 
performing at a very fundamental level: just as we develop theory of mind by familiarizing 
ourselves with the inner lives of characters and learn to infer their mental states, beliefs, desires 
from the hints left by their actions or the way they see and refer to their environments (including 
their spatial dimensions), so are their actions simulated at a bodily level during reading, an 
experience that accounts for immersion in the story and licenses empathy with characters.  
One common observation among readers is that this experience of being transported and of 
performance seems intensified in fictional narrative (in the novel, as well as in other media, like 
film) with respect to narrative about actual events. Wojciehowski and Gallese propose an 
explanation: 
 
Perhaps because in aesthetic experience we can temporarily suspend our grip on the world of 
our daily occupations. We liberate new energies and put them into the service of a new 
dimension that, paradoxically, can be more vivid than prosaic reality. The aesthetic 
experience of art works, more than a suspension of disbelief, can be thus interpreted as a sort 
of “liberated embodied simulation”. When reading a novel, looking at a visual art work, or 
attending a theatrical play or a movie, our embodied simulation becomes liberated, that is, it 




is freed from the burden of modeling our actual presence in daily life. We look at art from a 
safe distance from which our being open to the world is magnified. In a sense, to appreciate 
art means leaving the world behind in order to grasp it more fully. (n.p.) 
 
Perhaps we could add that fictional narrative, as an intentional work, is free from the causal noise 
that interferes with actual life. In having to discern trivial circumstances from intended sequences 
of events that generate significant outcomes, our attention is split and our involvement perhaps 
less intense than the one we allow ourselves to develop in fictional narrative. 
Before we move on to our final section, there is a notion I have been touching upon (and so 
do the authors I mention) which begs closer attention: the notion of world and with it the notion 
of worldmaking. Initially proposed by philosopher Nelson Goodman, this concept departs from 
the idea that the world we know already stems from other worlds, and what we experience as 
reality is the result of processes of worldmaking, which he identifies as composition and 
decomposition, weighting (attributing emphasis or relevance), ordering and reordering, deletion 
and suplementation and deformation. These processes are deployed through cultural shaping, 
resulting in world models or versions: “Worldmaking as we know it always starts from worlds 
already on hand; the making is a remaking”, claims Goodman (6). Narrative worlds thus may use 
the same processes of worldmaking for prompting mental representations of alternative life-
worlds. 
In the following and final section, we will look into a short narrative by Júlio Cortázar, 
which has been discussed at length in narratology, especially with respect to genre. We will try 
to see how notions of mental space, representation and worldmaking may help us understand 
how involvement is triggered by the text and how the surprise there entailed may render clear the 
experience of reading as being transported, performance and ultimately immersion and empathy. 
4. Circularity of space in Julio Cortázar’s La continuidad de los parques 
It is often observed with respect to literature that it is more eloquent in conveying experience 
than a non-fictional account or a scientific treatise. This goes also for the experience of reading, 
which is the central motif of Julio Cortázar’s La continuidad de los parques. First published in 
1964, the narrative starts with a man picking up a book he had begun days before and interrupted 
to attend to some business matters. He sits on a green armchair, his back turned to the door, 
delving in the pleasure of becoming engrossed in the story he is reading, while indulging in the 




comfort of his cigarettes, the velvety surface of the armchair and the view of the park through the 
window in front. He soon becomes absorbed by the story, in which a woman and a man meet in a 
cabin. They are lovers, as the woman’s gesture of kissing his face gives away. His face is 
bleeding, having been scratched by a branch. They are planning a murder, as he is going to kill 
her husband. They leave the cabin and go separate ways. The man approaches the house, 
following the instructions his lover has provided. He goes up the stairs, knife in hand, opens a 
door to the salon and sees his victim: a man sitting in a green armchair, reading a book.   
This story is a wonderful metanarrative account. It begins and ends with the description of 
the experience of reading: “He had begun to read a novel” vs. “the man in the chair reading a 
novel”.5 Along the way, the experience of reading is described in terms similar to those we 
encounter in narratology: “he permitted himself a slowly growing interest in the plot, in the 
characterizations” and further “letting himself be absorbed to the point where the images settled 
down and took on color and movement”. 
The pleasure involved in this slipping from the real surroundings to the alternative world on 
the pages is described as a guilty one: “he tasted the almost perverse pleasure of disengaging 
himself line by line from the things around him”. The reality that offers itself to him on the pages 
stands in sharp contrast with his own world, where he is faced with “urgent business 
conferences”, instructions to his lawyer or discussions with the manager of his estate. His world 
seems populated with only functional characters, with whom he interacts for matter-of-fact 
business. On the contrary, the world in the novel he reads outlays a “sordid dilemma of hero and 
heroin”, whose story involved the furtive “ceremonies of a secret passion”, kisses and caresses, 
and the careful planning of an impending murder “of that other body it was necessary to 
destroy”. In his own words, the reader-protagonist becomes witness to these deeds of the 
characters, but at no point is he disturbed by them, as they unfold in a different realm or 
dimension.  
 All along the story we, the now actual readers, mentally hold two parallel worlds that we 
compose and complete with prompts from the text, quite centrally spatial triggers. So, on the one 
hand, the actual world of the reader-protagonist, framed by the estate-related occupations and 
with a clear separation between the outside space, where the air dances under the oaks in the 
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park, and a space inside, separated from the former by large windows, where not even the 
thought of intrusion is allowed, and where the protagonist experiences the physical pleasure of 
sensorial perception: in the “tranquillity of his study”, “his head rests comfortably on the green 
velvet of the chair”, the cigarettes are within reach, he caresses the green velvet of the chair, its 
back toward the door.  
The world of the novel he is reading is marked by a spatial setting - the mountain cabin. 
Much of the intentionality of the characters’ actions is conveyed by spatial indicators: the parting 
trails that the couple follows, the avenue of trees leading to the house as the stage where the 
murder is to happen, the accurate description of the interior of the house, in the woman’s words 
resonating in the lover’s mind, implying her close acquaintance with the house and its habits and 
the premeditation of the murder. 
Time is, by comparison, of little importance in this story. It is space that drives the action 
and it is through spatial triggers – descriptions of space but also conveyance of characters’ 
interaction with these spaces – that the two worlds are set up. The reader-protagonist’s space, 
fictional to us, actual readers, and the lovers’ space, fictional to the protagonist. And as he does 
not intend to prevent the murder, but is mostly engrossed by the suspense of what is about to 
happen, so too we follow these actions, as if reading over his shoulder. Interfering is as little of 
his concern as it is of ours. And thus, we may be surprised by an impossible twist – after all we 
depict this world according to our own experience of our actual worlds. But confronted with this 
end, we are less likely to feel guilt (as is has been pointed in some readings of the text), because 
we know we are not able to interfere and are licensed instead to feel more liberated (as 
Wojciehowski and Gallese point out) to go with the story, following it where it might lead us, 
and forced to a constant remaking of worldmaking as such.  
Cognitively, the intriguing thing about this story is how it renders evident the experience of 
reading. Most significantly, how reading happens in the mind, and how we feel safe even when 
reading about the most terrible deeds, certain that they will not come back to haunt us. The 
sensation of being tricked by the text (and its intention), surprised by a twist in the end that is 
cognitive more than event-related, and of insecurity in the fuzzy boundaries between realities, is 
a common feature in other stories by Cortázar, for example the Axolotl (Cortázar and Blackburn). 
An anecdotal point, to finish this reading: I first came across this text years ago in a session 
of the Semiotic Circle, an informal gathering of semioticians and literary scholars that happened 
at regular intervals at the Department of Cognitive Science of Case Western Reserve University, 




in Cleveland. The group had read and discussed the text at length, enjoying the intricacies and 
the geniality behind its construction, when a colleague surprised us by asking: “But now what? Is 
he really actually going to kill him?” To which many a scholar in the room may have thought: 
“Does it matter?” I would like to think that it does. I suspect I am not the only one turning the 
page at the end of one or another story in search of a line or paragraph that may bestow more 
meaning to the story. In such cases one feels tricked, being left with a story that is unresolved 
and with the drama of knowing it forever incomplete. Perhaps in these cases the narrative space 
of conclusion demands more from the reader, who needs to reassess the whole story in order to 
assign meaning and be at peace. In a certain way this is akin to the effort we make in discourse, 
when our interlocutor susprises us by leaving a sentence incomplete or formulates it in an 
ambiguous way. In cases like these we pause for a moment, view the interaction anew, interpret 
its meaning and get on with our lives.  
  
Conclusions 
The main points this paper aimed at making could be summarized as follows. Firstly, a literary 
narrative is an index, pointing to a significant realm of experience or indicating a specific aspect 
of the human life-world. This idea means that in reading and interpreting a literary narrative we 
look for the intentionality contained and conveyed in the text. Unlike in normal experience, in a 
literary narrative every aspect is intentional and hence becomes meaningful in the process of 
interpretation. And just as prototypical discourse is an indexical prompt to the here and now of 
speaker and interlocutor, so do we understand the literary text to mean, i.e. to point to, human, 
life-world context of reference that is an aspect of human experience. 
Secondly, if literature is all about reading, as cognitive literary scholar Peter Stockwell 
claims (1), and reading goes on in the mind, literary narratives and how we interact with them 
are relevant to study from a cognitive perspective. What goes on in the mind as we read or how 
the experience of reading may be best described has been illustrated by the invitation at the 
beginning of this paper to imagine oneself walking on a beach to find a message in a bottle. 
Thirdly, it turns out that many cognitive processes – including those engaged while reading 
– are best understood and described in spatial terms. Metaphorical thinking is theorized in terms 
of domains and mappings, representation is conveyed as the holding of ideas in mental spaces, 
conceptual integration is described as the combination of ideas from different domains. From a 
cognitive perspective, and given the universality, constraints and possibilities of our brain-mind 




setup, it becomes important to know what and how much counts as a domain of experience, i.e. 
one of those domains that make up a significant human life-world. 
Fourthly, one spatial key-concept for the representation of reality is the concept of world. 
This concept informs not only the outline of our contextual experience, but it is a conceptual tool 
for sense-making of counter-factual realities, as the ones we come across in literary narrative.  
Finally, through the example discussed we can see how literature can be a privileged source 
of its own knowledge: cognitive evolutionist Merlin Donald, in his work on consciousness, 
mentioned that the kind of knowledge about this subjective experience of self-consciousness is 
different, whether we gain it from science or from art. Other than thinking of literature as 
adornment or illustration of scientific descriptions of the mind, Donald claims that “literature 
must become part of our database. It is perhaps the most articulate source we have on the 
phenomenology of human experience” (Donald 78). 
It is impressive to see how Cortázar had already had this intuition in the 1960s, much before 
the cognitive turn in the humanities. 
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